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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a new framework for credit value adjustment (CVA) that is a relatively new 
area of financial derivative modeling and trading. In contrast to previous studies, the model relies 
on the probability distribution of a default time/jump rather than the default time itself, as the 
default time is usually inaccessible. As such, the model can achieve a high order of accuracy with 
a relatively easy implementation. We find that the prices of risky contracts are normally 
determined via backward induction when their payoffs could be positive or negative. Moreover, 
the model can naturally capture wrong or right way risk. 
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For years, a widespread practice in the industry has been to mark derivative portfolios to market 
without taking counterparty risk into account. All cash flows are discounted using the LIBOR 
curve. But the real parties, in many cases, happen to be of lower credit quality than the 
hypothetical LIBOR party and have a chance of default. 
 As a consequence, the International Accounting Standard (IAS) 39 requires banks to 
provide a fair-value adjustment due to counterparty risk. Although credit value adjustment (CVA) 
became mandatory in 2000, it received a little attention until the recent financial crises in which 
the profit and loss (P&L) swings due to CVA changes were measured in billons of dollars. 
Interest in CVA began to grow. Now CVA has become the first line of defense and the central 
part of counterparty risk management. 
CVA not only allows institutions to move beyond the traditional control mindset of credit 
risk limits and to quantify counterparty risk as a single measurable P&L number, but also offers 
an opportunity for banks to dynamically manage, price and hedge counterparty risk. The benefits 
of CVA are widely acknowledged. Many banks have set up internal credit risk trading desks to 
manage counterparty risk on derivatives. 
The earlier works on CVA are mainly focused on unilateral CVA that assumes that only 
one counterparty is defaultable and the other one is default-free. The unilateral treatment neglects 
the fact that both counterparties may default, i.e., counterparty risk can be bilateral. A trend that 
has become increasingly relevant and popular has been to consider the bilateral nature of 
counterparty credit risk. Although most institutions view bilateral considerations as important in 
order to agree on new transactions, Hull and White (2013) argue that bilateral CVA is more 
controversial than unilateral CVA as the possibility that a dealer might default is in theory a 
benefit to the dealer. 
CVA, by definition, is the difference between the risk-free portfolio value and the true (or 
risky or defaultable) portfolio value that takes into account the possibility of a counterparty’s 
default. The risk-free portfolio value is what brokers quote or what trading systems or models 
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normally report. The risky portfolio value, however, is a relatively less explored and less 
transparent area, which is the main challenge and core theme for CVA. In other words, central to 
CVA is risky valuation. 
In general, risky valuation can be classified into two categories: the default time 
approach (DTA) and the default probability approach (DPA). The DTA involves the default time 
explicitly. Most CVA models in the literature (Brigo and Capponi (2008), Lipton and Sepp 
(2009), Pykhtin and Zhu (2006) and Gregory (2009), etc.) are based on this approach.  
Although the DTA is very intuitive, it has the disadvantage that it explicitly involves the 
default time. We are very unlikely to have complete information about a firm’s default point, 
which is often inaccessible (see Duffie and Huang (1996), Jarrow and Protter (2004), etc.). 
Usually, valuation under the DTA is performed via Monte Carlo simulation. On the other hand, 
however, the DPA relies on the probability distribution of the default time rather than the default 
time itself. Sometimes the DPA yields simple closed form solutions. 
The current popular CVA methodology (Pykhtin and Zhu (2006) and Gregory (2009), 
etc.) is first derived using DTA and then discretized over a time grid in order to yield a feasible 
solution. The discretization, however, is inaccurate. In fact, this model has never been rigorously 
proved. Since CVA is used for financial accounting and pricing, its accuracy is essential. 
Moreover, this current model is based on a well-known assumption, in which credit exposure and 
counterparty’s credit quality are independent. Obviously, it can not capture wrong/right way risk 
properly.  
In this paper, we present a framework for risky valuation and CVA. In contrast to 
previous studies, the model relies on the DPA rather than the DTA. Our study shows that the 
pricing process of a defaultable contract normally has a backward recursive nature if its payoff 
could be positive or negative.  
An intuitive way of understanding these backward recursive behaviours is that we can 
think of that any contingent claim embeds two default options. In other words, when entering an 
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OTC derivatives transaction, one party grants the other party an option to default and, at the same 
time, also receives an option to default itself. In theory, default may occur at any time. Therefore, 
the default options are American style options that normally require a backward induction 
valuation. 
Wrong way risk occurs when exposure to a counterparty is adversely correlated with the 
credit quality of that counterparty, while right way risk occurs when exposure to a counterparty is 
positively correlated with the credit quality of that counterparty. For example, in wrong way risk 
exposure tends to increase when counterparty credit quality worsens, while in right way risk 
exposure tends to decrease when counterparty credit quality declines. Wrong/right way risk, as an 
additional source of risk, is rightly of concern to banks and regulators. Since this new model 
allows us to incorporate correlated and potentially simultaneous defaults into risky valuation, it 
can naturally capture wrong/right way risk. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses unilateral risky 
valuation and unilateral CVA. Section 2 elaborates bilateral risky valuation and bilateral CVA. 
Section 3 presents numerical results. The conclusions are given in Section 4. . All proofs and a 
practical framework that embraces netting agreements, margining agreements and wrong/right 
way risk are contained in the appendices. 
 
1. Unilateral Risky Valuation and Unilateral CVA 
We consider a filtered probability space (  , F ,   0ttF , P ) satisfying the usual 
conditions, where   denotes a sample space; F  denotes a  -algebra; P  denotes a 
probability measure;   0ttF  denotes a filtration. 
The default model is based on the reduced-form approach proposed by Duffie and 
Singleton (1999) and Jarrow and Turnbell (1994), which does not explain the event of default 
endogenously, but characterizes it exogenously by a jump process. The stopping (or default) time 
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  of a firm is modeled as a Cox arrival process (also known as a doubly stochastic Poisson 
process) whose first jump occurs at default and is defined as, 
   t s dssht 0 ),(:inf      (1) 
where )(th  or ),( tth   denotes the stochastic hazard rate or arrival intensity dependent on an 
exogenous common state t , and   is a unit exponential random variable independent of t .  
It is well-known that the survival probability from time t to s in this framework is defined 
by 




 
s
t
duuhZtsPstp )(exp),|(:),(                   (2a) 
 The default probability for the period (t, s) in this framework is defined by 




 
s
t
duuhstpZtsPstq )(exp1),(1),|(:),(               (2b) 
Two counterparties are denoted as A and B. Let valuation date be t. Consider a financial 
contract that promises to pay a 0TX  from party B to party A at maturity date T, and nothing 
before date T. All calculations in the paper are from the perspective of party A. The risk free value 
of the financial contract is given by 
 tFTF XTtDEtV ),()(                 (3a) 
where 



  duurTtD
T
t
)(exp),(     (3b) 
where  tE F  denotes the expectation conditional on the tF , ),( TtD denotes the risk-free 
discount factor at time t for the maturity T and )(ur denotes the risk-free short rate at time u 
( Tut  ). 
Next, we turn to risky valuation. In a unilateral credit risk case, we assume that party A is 
default-free and party B is defaultable. Risky valuation can be generally classified into two 
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categories: the default time approach (DTA) and the default probability (intensity) approach 
(DPA).  
The DTA involves the default time explicitly. If there has been no default before time T 
(i.e., T ), the value of the contract at T is the payoff TX . If a default happens before T (i.e., 
Tt  ), a recovery payoff is made at the default time   as a fraction of the market value2 
given by )(V  where   is the default recovery rate and )(V  is the market value at default. 
Under a risk-neutral measure, the value of this defaultable contract is the discounted expectation 
of all the payoffs and is given by 
  tTTT VtDXTtDEtV F|1)(),(1),()(                      (4) 
where Y  is an indicator function that is equal to one if Y is true and zero otherwise. 
Although the DTA is very intuitive, it has the disadvantage that it explicitly involves the 
default time/jump. We are very unlikely to have complete information about a firm’s default 
point, which is often inaccessible. Usually, valuation under the DTA is performed via Monte 
Carlo simulation.  
The DPA relies on the probability distribution of the default time rather than the default 
time itself. We divide the time period (t, T) into n very small time intervals ( t ) and assume that 
a default may occur only at the end of each very small period. In our derivation, we use the 
approximation   yy 1exp  for very small y. The survival and the default probabilities for the 
period ( t , tt  ) are given by 
  tthtthtttptp  )(1)(exp),(:)(ˆ               (5a) 
  tthtthtttqtq  )()(exp1),(:)(ˆ               (5b) 
The binomial default rule considers only two possible states: default or survival. For the 
one-period ),( ttt   economy, at time tt  the asset either defaults with the default 
                                   
2 Here we use the recovery of market value (RMV) assumption.  
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probability ),( tttq   or survives with the survival probability ),( tttp  . The survival payoff 
is equal to the market value )( ttV   and the default payoff is a fraction of the market value: 
)()( ttVtt  . Under a risk-neutral measure, the value of the asset at t is the expectation of 
all the payoffs discounted at the risk-free rate and is given by 
       tt ttVttyEttVtqttpttrEtV FF )()(exp)()(ˆ)()(ˆ)(exp)(                  (6) 
where   )()()(1)()()( tctrtthtrty    denotes the risky rate and  )(1)()( tthtc   is called 
the (short) credit spread.  
Similarly, we have 
  ttttVtttyEttV  F)2()(exp)(                    (7) 
Note that  tty  )(exp  is ttF  -measurable. By definition, an ttF  -measurable 
random variable is a random variable whose value is known at time tt  . Based on the taking 
out what is known and tower properties of conditional expectation, we have 
  
     
  ti
ttt
t
ttVttityE
ttVtttyEttyE
ttVttyEtV
F
FF
F
)2())(exp
)2()(exp)(exp
)()(exp)(
1
0 


 
                  (8) 
By recursively deriving from t forward over T and taking the limit as t  approaches zero, 
the risky value of the asset can be expressed as 









  t
T
t
TVduuyEtV F)()(exp)(            (9) 
 We may think of )(uy  as the risk-adjusted short rate. Equation (9) is the same as 
Equation (10) in Duffie and Singleton [1999], which is the market model for pricing risky bonds. 
Using the DPA, we obtain a closed-form solution for pricing an asset subject to credit risk.  Other 
good examples of the DPA are the CDS model proposed by J.P. Morgan (1999) and a more 
generic risky model presented by Xiao (2013a). 
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In theory, a default may happen at any time, i.e., a risky contract is continuously 
defaultable. This Continuous Time Risky Valuation Model is accurate but sometimes complex 
and expensive. For simplicity, people sometimes prefer the Discrete Time Risky Valuation Model 
that assumes that a default may only happen at some discrete times. A natural selection is to 
assume that a default may occur only on the payment dates. Fortunately, the level of accuracy for 
this discrete approximation is well inside the typical bid-ask spread for most applications (see 
O’Kane and Turnbull (2003)). From now on, we will focus on the discrete setting only, but many 
of the points we make are equally applicable to the continuous setting. 
For a derivative contract, usually its payoff may be either an asset or a liability to each 
party. Thus, we further relax the assumption and suppose that TX  may be positive or negative. 
In the case of 0TX , the survival value is equal to the payoff TX  and the default payoff 
is a fraction of the payoff TX . Whereas in the case of 0TX , the contract value is the payoff 
itself, because the default risk of party B is irrelevant for unilateral risky valuation in this case. 
Therefore, we have 
Proposition 1: The unilateral risky value of the single-payment contract in a discrete-time setting 
is given by 
 tFTXTtFEtV ),()(       (10a) 
where 
  )(1),(11),(),( 0 TTtqTtDTtF TX       (10b) 
Proof: See the appendix. 
Here ),( TtF  can be regarded as a risk-adjusted discount factor. Proposition 1 says that 
the unilateral risky valuation of the single payoff contract has a dependence on the sign of the 
payoff. If the payoff is positive, the risky value is equal to the risk-free value minus the 
discounted potential loss. Otherwise, the risky value is equal to the risk-free value. 
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Proposition 1 can be easily extended from one-period to multiple-periods. Suppose that a 
defaultable contract has m cash flows. Let the m cash flows be represented as 1X ,…, mX  with 
payment dates 1T ,…, mT . Each cash flow may be positive or negative. We have the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 2: The unilateral risky value of the multiple-payment contract is given by 
      mi tiij jj XTTFEtV 1 10 1),()( F        (11a) 
where 0Tt   and 
  )(1),(11),(),( 110))((11 11    jjjTVXjjjj TTTqTTDTTF jj        (11b) 
Proof: See the appendix. 
The risky valuation in Proposition 2 has a backward nature. The intermediate values are 
vital to determine the final price. For a discrete time interval, the current risky value has a 
dependence on the future risky value. Only on the final payment date mT , the value of the 
contract and the maximum amount of information needed to determine the risk-adjusted discount 
factor are revealed. The coupled valuation behavior allows us to capture wrong/right way risk 
properly where counterparty credit quality and market prices may be correlated. This type of 
problem can be best solved by working backwards in time, with the later risky value feeding into 
the earlier ones, so that the process builds on itself in a recursive fashion, which is referred to as 
backward induction. The most popular backward induction valuation algorithms are lattice/tree 
and regression-based Monte Carlo.  
For an intuitive explanation, we can posit that a defaultable contract under the unilateral 
credit risk assumption has an embedded default option (see Sorensen and Bollier (1994)). In other 
words, one party entering a defaultable financial transaction actually grants the other party an 
option to default. If we assume that a default may occur at any time, the default option is an 
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American style option. American options normally have backward recursive natures and require 
backward induction valuations.  
The similarity between American style financial options and American style default 
options is that both require a backward recursive valuation procedure. The difference between 
them is in the optimal strategy. The American financial option seeks an optimal value by 
comparing the exercise value with the continuation value, whereas the American default option 
seeks an optimal discount factor based on the option value in time. 
The unilateral CVA, by definition, can be expressed as 
      mi tiij jjiF XTTFTtDEtVtVtCVA 1 10 1),(),()()()( F       (12) 
Proposition 2 provides a general form for pricing a unilateral defaultable contract. 
Applying it to a particular situation in which we assume that all the payoffs are nonnegative, we 
derive the following corollary: 
Corollary 1: If all the payoffs are nonnegative, the risky value of the multiple-payments contract 
is given by 
      mi tiij jj XTTFEtV 1 10 1),()( F     (13a) 
where 0Tt   and 
  )(1),(1),(),( 1111   jjjjjjj TTTqTTDTTF                 (13b) 
The proof of this corollary is easily obtained according to Proposition 2 by setting 
  0)( 11   jj TVX , since the value of the contract at any time is also nonnegative. 
The CVA in this case is given by 
        mi tiij jjjiF XTTTqTtDEtVtVtCVA 1 10 11 ))(1)(,(11),()()()( F   (14) 
The current popular CVA model (e.g., equation (17) in Pykhtin and Zhu (2007) and 
equation (3) in Gregory (2009)) is quite different from above either equation (12) or equation (14). 
As a matter of fact, the current CVA model has never been rigorously proved. In order to reflect 
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the economic value of counterparty credit risk, to measure the profit and loss of a bank and to 
provide proper incentives to traders, a good CVA model must be not only rigorous and accurate 
but also feasible to implement. 
 
2. Bilateral Risky Valuation and Bilateral CVA 
There is ample evidence that corporate defaults are correlated. The default of a firm’s 
counterparty might affect its own default probability. Thus, default correlation and dependence 
arise due to the counterparty relations. Default correlation can be positive or negative. The effect 
of positive correlation is usually called contagion, whereas the latter is referred to as competition 
effect. 
Two counterparties are denoted as A and B. The binomial default rule considers only two 
possible states: default or survival. Therefore, the default indicator jY  for party j (j=A, B) follows 
a Bernoulli distribution, which takes value 1 with default probability jq  and value 0 with survival 
probability jp , i.e.,  jj pYP  }0{  and jj qYP  }1{ . The marginal default distributions can be 
determined by the reduced-form models. The joint distributions of a bivariate Bernoulli variable 
can be easily obtained via the marginal distributions by introducing extra correlations. 
Consider a pair of random variables ( AY , BY ) that has a bivariate Bernoulli distribution. 
The joint probability representations are given by 
ABBABA ppYYPp  )0,0(:00      (15a) 
ABBABA qpYYPp  )1,0(:01      (15b) 
 ABBABA pqYYPp  )0,1(:10      (15c) 
 ABBABA qqYYPp  )1,1(:11      (15d) 
where jj qYE )( , jjj qp
2 ,   BBAAABBAABBBAAAB pqpqqYqYE   ))((:  where AB  
denotes the default correlation coefficient and  AB  denotes the default covariance. 
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Table 1. Payoffs of a bilaterally defaultable contract 
This table displays all possible payoffs at time T. In the case of 0TX , there are a total of four 
possible states at time T: i) Both A and B survive with probability 00p . The contract value is 
equal to the payoff TX . ii) A defaults but B survives with probability 10p . The contract value is 
TB X , where B  represents the non-default recovery rate
3 . B =0 represents the one-way 
settlement rule, while B =1 represents the two-way settlement rule. iii) A survives but B defaults 
with probability 01p . The contract value is TB X , where B  represents the default recovery rate. 
iv) Both A and B default with probability 11p . The contract value is TAB X , where AB  denotes 
the joint recovery rate when both parties A and B default simultaneously. A similar logic applies 
to the case of 0TX .  
State 0,0  BA YY  0,1  BA YY  1,0  BA YY  1,1  BA YY  
Comments A & B survive A defaults, B survives A survives, B defaults A & B default 
Probability 00p  10p  01p  11p  
0TX  TX  TB X  TB X  TAB X  
Payoff 
0TX  TX  TA X  TA X  TAB X  
 
                                   
3 There are two default settlement rules in the market. The one-way payment rule was specified 
by the early ISDA master agreement. The non-defaulting party is not obligated to compensate the 
defaulting party if the remaining market value of the instrument is positive for the defaulting 
party. The two-way payment rule is based on current ISDA documentation. The non-defaulting 
party will pay the full market value of the instrument to the defaulting party if the contract has 
positive value to the defaulting party. 
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Suppose that a financial contract that promises to pay a TX  from party B to party A at 
maturity date T, and nothing before date T where tT  . The payoff TX  may be positive or 
negative, i.e. the contract may be either an asset or a liability to each party. All calculations are 
from the perspective of party A. 
At time T, there are a total of four ( 42 2  ) possible states shown in Table 1. The risky 
value of the contract is the discounted expectation of the payoffs and is given by the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 3: The bilateral risky value of the single-payment contract is given by 
    tt FF TAXBXT XTtkTtkTtDEXTtKEtV TT ),(1),(1),(),()( 00     (16a) 
where 
 )()()(1),(),(),()(
),(),()(),(),()(),(),(),(
TTTTtTtqTtqT
TtqTtpTTtpTtqTTtpTtpTtk
ABBBABABAB
ABBABBABB



   (16b) 
 )()()(1),(),(),()(
),(),()(),(),()(),(),(),(
TTTTtTtqTtqT
TtqTtpTTtpTtqTTtpTtpTtk
ABAAABABAB
BAABAAABA



   (16c) 
Proof: See the appendix. 
We may think of ),( TtK as the risk-adjusted discount factor. Proposition 3 tells us that 
the bilateral risky price of a single-payment contract can be expressed as the present value of the 
payoff discounted by a risk-adjusted discount factor that has a switching-type dependence on the 
sign of the payoff. 
Using a similar derivation as in Proposition 2, we can easily extend Proposition 3 from 
one-period to multiple-periods. Suppose that a defaultable contract has m cash flows. Let the m 
cash flows be represented as iX  with payment dates iT , where i = 1,…,m. Each cash flow may 
be positive or negative. The bilateral risky value of the multiple-payment contract is given by 
Proposition 4: The bilateral risky value of the multiple-payment contract is given by 
      mi tiij jj XTTKEtV 1 10 1),()( F     (17a) 
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where 0Tt   and 
 ),(1),(1),(),( 10))((10))((11 1111    jjATVXjjBTVXjjjj TTkTTkTTDTTK jjjj      (17b) 
where ),( 1jjA TTk and ),( 1jjB TTk  are defined in Proposition 3. 
Proof: The proof is similar to Proposition 2 by replacing ),( 1jj TTF  with ),( 1jj TTK . 
Proposition 4 says that the pricing process of a multiple-payment contract has a backward 
nature since there is no way of knowing which risk-adjusted discounting rate should be used 
without knowledge of the future value. Only on the maturity date, the value of the contract and 
the decision strategy are clear. Therefore, the evaluation must be done in a backward fashion, 
working from the final payment date towards the present. This type of valuation process is 
referred to as backward induction.  
There is a common misconception in the market. Many people believe that the cash flows 
of a defaultable financial contract can be priced independently and then be summed up to give the 
final risky price of the contract. We emphasize here that this conclusion is only true of the 
financial contracts whose payoffs are always positive. In the cases where the promised payoffs 
could be positive or negative, the valuation requires not only a backward recursive induction 
procedure, but also a strategic selection of different discount factors according to the market 
value in time. This coupled valuation process allows us to capture correlation between 
counterparties and market factors. 
 The bilateral CVA of the multiple-payment contract can be expressed as 
         mi tiij jjtiiF XTTKEXTtDEtVtVtCVA 1 10 1),(),()()()( FF      (18) 
 
3. Numerical Results 
In this section, we present some numerical results for CVA calculation based on the 
theory described above. First, we study the impact of margin agreements on CVA. The testing 
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portfolio consists of a number of interest rate, equity, and foreign exchange derivatives. The 
number of simulation scenarios (or paths) is 20,000. The time buckets are set weekly. If the 
computational requirements exceed the system limit, one can reduce both the number of scenarios 
and the number of time buckets. The time buckets can be designed fine-granularity at the short 
end (e.g., daily and then weekly) and coarse-granularity at the far end (e.g. monthly and then 
yearly). The rationale is that the calculation becomes less accurate due to the accumulated error 
from simulation discretization, and inherited errors from calibration of the underlying models, 
such as those due to the change of macro-economic climate. The collateral margin period of risk 
is assumed to be 14 days (2 weeks). 
We use a CIR (Cox-Ingersoll-Ross) model for interest rate and hazard rate scenario 
generations; a modified GBM (Geometric Brownian Motion) model for equity and collateral 
evolutions; and a BK (Black Karasinski) model for foreign exchange dynamics. The results are 
presented in the following tables. Table 2 illustrates that if party A has an infinite collateral 
threshold AH  i.e., no collateral requirement on A, the CVA value increases while the 
threshold BH  increases. Table 3 shows that if party B has an infinite collateral threshold 
BH , the CVA value actually decreases while the threshold AH  increases. This reflects the 
bilateral impact of the collaterals on the CVA. The impact is mixed in Table 4 when both parties 
have finite collateral thresholds. 
 
Table 2. The impact of collateral threshold BH  on the CVA 
This table shows that given an infinite AH , the CVA increases while BH  increases, where BH  
denotes the collateral threshold of party B and AH  denotes the collateral threshold of party A. 
Collateral Threshold BH  10.1 Mil 15.1 Mil 20.1 Mil Infinite (  ) 
CVA 19,550.91 20,528.65 21,368.44 22,059.30 
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Table 3. The impact of collateral threshold AH  on the CVA 
This table shows that given an infinite BH , the CVA decreases while AH  increases, where BH  
denotes the collateral threshold of party B and AH  denotes the collateral threshold of party A. 
Collateral Threshold AH  10.1 Mil 15.1 Mil 20.1 Mil Infinite (  ) 
CVA 28,283.64 25,608.92 23,979.11 22,059.30 
 
Table 4. The impact of the both collateral thresholds on the CVA 
The CVA may increase or decrease while both collateral thresholds change, where BH  denotes 
the collateral threshold of party B and AH  denotes the collateral threshold of party A. This 
reflects the fact that the collaterals have bilateral impacts on the CVA.  
Collateral Threshold BH  10.1 Mil 15.1 Mil 20.1 Mil Infinite (  ) 
Collateral Threshold AH  10.1 Mil 15.1 Mil 20.1 Mil Infinite (  ) 
CVA 25,752.98 22,448.45 23,288.24 22,059.30 
 
Next, we examine the impact of wrong way risk. Wrong way risk occurs when exposure 
to a counterparty is adversely correlated with the credit quality of that counterparty, while right 
way risk occurs when exposure to a counterparty is positively correlated with the credit quality of 
that counterparty. Wrong/right way risk, as an additional source of risk, is rightly of concern to 
banks and regulators. 
Some financial markets are closely interlinked, while others are not. For example, CDS 
price movements have a feedback effect on the equity market, as a trading strategy commonly 
employed by banks and other market participants consists of selling a CDS on a reference entity 
and hedging the resulting credit exposure by shorting the stock. On the other hand, Moody’s 
Investor’s Service (2000) presents statistics that suggest that the correlations between interest 
rates and CDS spreads are very small.  
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 To capture wrong/right way risk, we need to determine the dependency between 
counterparties and to correlate the credit spreads or hazard rates with the other market risk factors, 
e.g. equities, commodities, etc., in the scenario generation. 
We use an equity swap as an example. Assume the correlation between the underlying 
equity price and the credit quality (hazard rate) of party B is  . The impact of the correlation on 
the CVA is show in Table 5. The results say that the CVA increases when the absolute value of 
the negative correlation increases. 
 
Table 5. The impact of wrong way risk on the CVA 
This table shows that the CVA increases while the negative correlation  increases in the 
absolute value. We use an equity swap as an example and assume that there is a negative 
correlation between the equity price and the credit quality of party B. 
Correlation   0 -50% -100% 
CVA 165.15 205.95 236.99 
 
4. Conclusion 
This article presents a framework for pricing risky contracts and their CVAs. The model 
relies on the probability distribution of the default jump rather than the default jump itself, 
because the default jump is normally inaccessible. We find that the valuation of risky assets and 
their CVAs, in most situations, has a backward recursive nature and requires a backward 
induction valuation. An intuitive explanation is that two counterparties implicitly sell each other 
an option to default when entering into an OTC derivative transaction. If we assume that a default 
may occur at any time, the default options are American style options. If we assume that a default 
may only happen on the payment dates, the default options are Bermudan style options. Both 
Bermudan and American options require backward induction valuations.  
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Based on our theory, we propose a novel cash-flow-based framework (see appendix) for 
calculating bilateral CVA at the counterparty portfolio level. This framework can easily 
incorporate various credit mitigation techniques, such as netting agreements and margin 
agreements, and can capture wrong/right way risk. Numerical results show that these credit 
mitigation techniques and wrong/right way risk have significant impacts on CVA.  
 
Appendix 
A. Proofs 
 Proof of Proposition 1: Under the unilateral credit risk assumption, we only consider the 
default risk when the asset is in the money. Assume that a default may only occur on the payment 
date. Therefore, the risky value of the asset at t is the discounted expectation of all possible 
payoffs and is given by 
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where  
  )(1),(11),(),( 0 TTtqTtDTtF TX      (A1b) 
Proof of Proposition 2: Let 0Tt  . On the first payment day, let )( 1TV  denote the risky 
value of the asset excluding the current cash flow 1X . According to Proposition 1, the risky value 
of the asset at t is given by 
  tF)(),()( 1110 TVXTTFEtV      (A2a) 
where 
    )(1),(11),(),( 0)(1010 11 TTtqTTDTTF XTV      (A2b) 
Similarly, we have 
  
1
)(),()( 22211 TTVXTTFETV F     (A3) 
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 Note that ),( 10 TTF  is 1TF -measurable. According to the taking out what is known and 
tower properties of conditional expectation, we have 
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 By recursively deriving from 2T  forward over mT , where mm XTV )( , we have 
      mi tiij jj XTTFEtV 1 10 1),()( F     (A5) 
Proof of Proposition 3: We assume that a default may only occur on the payment date. 
At time T, there are four possible states: 1) both A and B survive, 2) A defaults but B survives, 3) 
A survives but B defaults, and 4) both A and B default. The joint distributions of A and B are 
given by (15). Depending on whether the payoff is in the money or out of the money at T, we 
have 
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B. A practical framework for calculating bilateral CVA 
We develop a practical framework for calculating bilateral CVA at counterparty portfolio 
level based on the theory described above. The framework incorporates netting and margin 
agreements, and captures right/wrong way risk.  
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Two parties are denoted as A and B. All calculations are from the perspective of party A. 
Let the valuation date be t. The CVA computation procedure consists of the following steps. 
B.1. Risk-neutral Monte Carlo scenario generation 
One core element of the trading credit risk modeling is the Monte Carlo scenario 
generation (market evolution). This must be able to run a large number of scenarios for each risk 
factor with flexibility over parameterization of processes and treatment of correlation between 
underlying factors. Credit exposure may be calculated under real probability measure, while CVA 
or pricing counterparty credit risk should be conducted under risk-neutral probability measure.  
Due to the extensive computational intensity of pricing counterparty risk, there will 
inevitably be some compromise of limiting the number of market scenarios (paths) and the 
number of simulation dates (also called “time buckets” or “time nodes”). The time buckets are 
normally designed fine-granularity at the short end and coarse-granularity at the far end. The 
details of scenario generation are beyond the scope of this paper. 
B.2. Cash flow generation 
For ease of illustration, we choose a vanilla interest rate swap, as interest rate swaps 
collectively account for around two-thirds of both the notional and market value of all 
outstanding derivatives. 
Assume that party A pays a fixed rate, while party B pays a floating-rate. Assume that 
there are M time buckets ( MTTT ,...,, 10 ) in each scenario and N cash flows in the sample swap. 
Let consider scenario j first. 
For swaplet i, there are four important dates: the fixing date fit , , the starting date sit , , 
the ending date eit ,  and the payment date pit , . In general, these dates are not coincidently at the 
simulation time buckets. The time relationship between swaplet i and the simulation time buckets 
is illustrated in Figure B1. 
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Figure B1: An interest rate swaplet 
This figure illustrates the time relationship between an interest rate swaplet and the simulation 
time buckets. The floating leg of the swaplet is reset at the fixing date fit ,  with the starting date 
sit , , the ending date eit , , and the payment date pit , . The simulation time buckets are 
11,...,,  kii TTT . The simulated interest rate curve is starting at fit , . Both fixed rate payments and 
floating-rate payments occur on the same payment dates. 
 
The cash flow of swaplet i is determined at the fixing date fit ,  that is assumed to be 
between the simulation time buckets jT  and 1jT . First, we need to create an interest rate curve 
observed at fit ,  by interpolating the interest rate curves simulated at jT  and 1jT  via either 
Brownian Bridge or linear interpolation. The linear interpolation is the expectation of the 
Brownian Bridge. Then we can calculate the payoff of swaplet i at scenario j as 
  ),(),;( ,,,,,, eisieisifiij ttRtttFN       (B1) 
 
jT 1jT kT 1kTfit , sit , eit , pit ,
Terms 
R
ates 
Interest rate curve simulated at fit ,  
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where N denotes the notional; ),;( ,,, eisifi tttF  denotes the simply compounded forward rate reset 
at fit ,  for the forward period ( sit , , eit , ); ),( ,, eisi tt  denotes the accrual factor or day count 
fraction for the period ( sit , , eit , ) and R denotes the fixed rate. 
The cash flow amount calculated by (B1) is paid on the payment date pit , . This value 
should be allocated into the nearest previous time bucket kT  as: 
 ),(
~
,,,, pikijikj tTD       (B2) 
where ),( , pik tTD  denotes the risk-free discount factor based on the interest rate curve simulated 
at kT . 
 Cash flow generation for products without early-exercise provision is quite 
straightforward. For early-exercise products, one can use the approach proposed by Longstaff and 
Schwartz (2001) to obtain the optimal exercise boundaries and then the payoffs. 
B3.  Aggregation and netting agreements 
After generating cash flows for each deal, we need to aggregate them at counterparty 
portfolio level at each scenario and each time bucket. The cash flows are aggregated by either 
netting or nonnetting based on the netting agreements. A netting agreement is a provision that 
allows the offset of settlement payments and receipts on all contracts between two counterparties. 
Another important use of netting is the close-out netting that allows the offset of close-out values. 
For netting, we add all cash flows together at the same scenario and the same time bucket 
to recognize offsetting. The aggregated cash flow under netting at scenario j and time bucket k is 
given by 
 
i
ikjkj ,,,
~~       (B3) 
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For nonnetting, we divided cash flows into positive and negative groups and add them 
separately. In other words, the offsetting is not recognized. The aggregated cash flows under 
nonnetting at scenario j and time bucket k are given by 
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B4.  Margin (or collateral) agreements 
Under a margin agreement, the collateral is called as soon as the counterparty exposure 
rises above the given collateral threshold H  or more precisely above the threshold (TH) plus 
minimum transferable amount (MTA). That would result in reduction of exposure by the collateral 
amount held  .  Consequently, there would be no exposure above the threshold H  if there were 
no time lags between collateral calling, posting, liquidating and closing out.  However, these lags, 
which are actually the margin period of risk, do exist in practice.  The collateral can depreciate or 
appreciate in value during this period. The lags expose the bank with additional exposure above 
the threshold, which is normally referred to as collateralized exposure. Clearly, the longer the 
margin period of risk is the larger the collateralized exposure is. For a more detailed discussion 
on collateralization, see Xiao (2013b). 
Assume that the collateral margin period of risk is  . The collateral methodology 
consists of the following procedures: 
First, for any time bucket kT , we introduce an additional collateral time node kT . 
Second, we compute the portfolio value )( k
F
j TV  at scenario j and at collateral time 
node ( kT ). 
Then, we calculate the collateral required to reduce the exposure at ( kT ) as 
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where  BBB MTATHH   is the collateral threshold of party B and )( AAA MTATHH   is 
the negative collateral threshold of party A. 
Each bank has its own collateral simulation methodology that simulates the collateral 
value evolving from )(  kj T  to )( kj T  over the margin period of risk  . The details of 
collateral simulation are beyond the scope of this paper. Assume that the collateral value )( kj T  
has already been calculated. 
Next, we compute the change amount of the collaterals between kT  and 1kT  as 
 )()()(: 1,  kjkjkjkj TTT     (B6) 
Since our CVA methodology is based on cash flows, we model collateral as a reversing 
cash flow kj,  at kT . Finally, the total cash flow at kT  is given by 
  kjkjkj ,,,
~        (B7) 
B5.  CVA Calculation 
 After aggregating all cash flows via netting and margin agreements, one can price a 
portfolio in the same manner as pricing a single deal. We assume that the reader is familiar with 
the regression-based Monte Carlo valuation model proposed by Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) 
and thus do not repeat some well-known procedures for brevity. 
The risk-free value at scenario j is given by 
     mk kjki iijFj TTDtV 1 ,10 1 ),()(      (B8) 
 The final risk-free portfolio value is the average (expectation) of all scenarios given by 
        mk kjki iijFjF TTDEtVEtV 1 ,10 1 ),()()(     (B9) 
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The risky valuation procedure is performed iteratively, starting at the last effective time 
bucket mT , and then working backwards towards the present. We know the value of the portfolio 
at the final effective time bucket, which is equal to the last cash flow, i.e. mjm
D
j TV ,)(  . 
Based on the sign of )( m
D
j TV  and Proposition 4, we can choose a proper risk-adjusted 
discount factor  and then use the well-known regression approach proposed by Longstaff and 
Schwartz (2001) to estimate )( 1mDj TV  from cross-sectional information in the simulation by 
using least squares. We conduct the backward induction process, performed by iteratively rolling 
back a series of long jumps from the final effective time bucket mT  across time nodes until we 
reach the valuation date. Then, the present value at scenario j is 
     mk kjki iijj TTK1 ,10 10, ),(     (B9) 
 The final true/risky portfolio value is the average (expectation) of all scenarios, given by 
        mk kjki iijjD TTKEEtV 1 ,10 10, ),()(     (B10) 
CVA is by definition the difference between the risk-free portfolio value and the true (or 
risky or defaultable) portfolio value given by 
           mk kjki iijkjki iijDFB TTKTTDEtVtVtCVA 1 ,10 1,10 1 ),(),()()()(      (B11) 
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